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INTRODUCTION
Libel tourism is the term given to the practice of obstructing the
First Amendment by suing American authors and publishers for
defamation in foreign courts where a lower legal standard allows for
1
easier recovery. Libel plaintiffs typically seek out countries whose laws
disfavor speech critical of public figures, and the countries often have a
tenuous connection to the purportedly defamatory statements that
2
prompted the suit. This new trend ultimately undermines the
Constitution’s First Amendment principles of free speech and free press
3
by providing a “legal loophole.” Moreover, due to the rise of
technological advances and Internet accessibility worldwide, a
published document has the potential to appear in any jurisdiction in the
world. As a result, a libel plaintiff may have the option of initiating
litigation in any jurisdiction they may choose, even though the
4
publication occurred in the United States. In addition, under the
doctrines of reciprocity and comity, the United States courts can enforce
these foreign judgments so long as a court that recognizes and enforces
United States judgments rendered the decision. All these circumstances
taken together effectively allow the foreign libel plaintiff to bypass the
5
protections afforded by the First Amendment.
The differences in U.S. and U.K. libel law were once a topic
reserved for academic journals and law school classrooms. However, a
case in 1996 caused the two countries’ divide over libel law
6
jurisprudence to be brought to the forefront. Controversial English
1

See Libel Tourism: Hearing on H.R. 6146 Before the Subcomm. on Commercial
and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 9-10, 1 (2009) [hereinafter
Hearing]; Historical Libel Tourism Bill Becomes Law, BAKER HOSTETLER (Aug. 10, 2010),
available at http://www.bakerlaw.com/news/historic-libel-tourism-bill-becomes-law-08-102010/.
2
Hearing, supra note 1, at 1.
3
The “legal loophole” refers to the practice of libel plaintiffs who strategically
seek out foreign countries that have a lower legal standard than provided by the United
States First Amendment even though a United States court would be a more appropriate
forum. Tara Sturtevant, Comment, Can the United States Talk the Talk & Walk the Walk
When it Comes to Libel Tourism: How the Freedom to Sue Abroad can Kill the Freedom of
Speech at Home, 22 PACE INT’L L. REV. 269, 269 (2010).
4
Publication is defined as “the communication of the allegedly defamatory
material to a third person.” It can be accomplished through many means, for example, it can
be “written, oral, broadcast, printed, photographic, etc.” MARC A. FRANKLIN ET AL.,
MASS MEDIA LAW 234 (8th ed. 2011).
5
See discussion of reciprocity and comity infra Part IV.
6
Hearing, supra note 1, at 20 (written statement by Bruce D. Brown, Partner,
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historian David Irving sued Deborah Lipstadt, a professor from Emory
University, in London for defamation after she correctly called him a
7
“Holocaust denier.” The Irving-Lipstadt case was international news,
and dramatically brought the significant divide between U.S. and U.K.
8
defamation law into focus. Ms. Lipstadt assumed the litigation would
be a “‘classic nuisance suit’” but after five years, a ten day trial, and
9
costs of more than $3 million she escaped liability.
Soon after the Irving-Lipstadt case, a case arose that “opened a
new phase in the transatlantic free speech rift”: a lawsuit brought in
England by a non-U.K. resident to capitalize on the country’s plaintiff10
friendly libel laws. In 1997, Boris Berezovsky, a Russian tycoon, filed
suit in London against Forbes magazine over an article titled
“Godfather of the Kremlin?” written by Russian-American journalist
11
Paul Kiebnikov. Forbes argued that it made little sense to litigate a
case in England, involving a Russian plaintiff and a New York
magazine, when only a fraction of the article’s readers were located
12
13
there. Nevertheless, the British courts refused to “loosen their grips”
on the suit and Forbes eventually withdrew their claims and settled the
14
case rather than face trial.
Following the rise in Internet publishing that weakened traditional
notions of jurisdictional lines across the globe, politicians and
billionaires “soon flocked – virtually, at least – to England to settle their
15
scores where they knew the deck was stacked in their favor.” The
Baker & Hostetler, LLP).
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id.; Sarah Lyall, Where Suing for Libel is a National Specialty; Britain’s
Plaintiff-Friendly Laws Have Become a Magnet for Litigators, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2000,
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/07/22/arts/where-suing-for-libel-national-specialty-britain-splaintiff-friendly-laws-have.html.
10
Hearing, supra note 1, at 20 (written statement by Bruce D. Brown, Partner,
Baker & Hostetler, LLP).
11
Editor’s Note, Berezovsky versus Forbes, FORBES.COM, Mar. 6, 2003,
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/1996/1230/5815090a_print.html.
12
See Berezovsky v. Michaels and Others, (House of Lords), [2000] 1, W.L.R.
1004, 1008-09 (Eng.), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199900/
ldjudgmt/jd000511/bere-1.htm.
13
Hearing, supra note 1, at 20 (written statement by Bruce D. Brown, Partner,
Baker & Hostetler, LLP).
14
Editor’s Note, Berezovsky versus Forbes, FORBES.COM, Mar. 6, 2003,
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/1996/1230/5815090a_print.html.
15
Hearing, supra note 1, at 20 (written statement by Bruce D. Brown, Partner,
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leading case to highlight the phenomenon of libel tourism, which
16
subsequently prompted state and federal legislation, was Ehrenfeld v.
17
Mahfouz. In 2004, Khalid Salim Bin Mahfouz, libel tourism’s most
18
notorious “frequent flier,” filed a defamation lawsuit against Dr.
Rachel Ehrenfeld in an English court in response to being named a
potential terrorism financier in Dr. Ehrenfeld’s book Funding Evil: How
19
Terrorism is Financed and How to Stop It. Mahfouz obtained a default
libel judgment against her enjoining further publication of the
20
statements about Mahfouz in England and Wales. Subsequently, Dr.
Ehrenfeld sought a declaratory judgment against Mahfouz in the District
Court for the Southern District of New York in which she argued that
the foreign judgment was unenforceable and repugnant to her First
21
Amendment rights. The district court dismissed the action for lack of
22
personal jurisdiction over Mahfouz. In a certified question to the Court
of Appeals of New York, Dr. Ehrenfeld claimed that absent a U.S. court
ruling regarding her rights, the foreign judgment would have the
practical effect of chilling her protected speech rights in the United
23
States. On December 20, 2007, the Court of Appeals of New York held
that Mahfouz’s contacts with the state of New York did not constitute a
transaction of business in the state and thus New York’s long arm
24
25
statute did not confer personal jurisdiction over him. Because a U.S.
court cannot adjudicate a case without personal jurisdiction over a

Baker & Hostetler, LLP).
16
See discussion of New York’s Libel Terrorism Protection Act and the SPEECH
Act infra Part V.
17
Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz, 518 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2008); Bin Mahfouz v. Ehrenfeld,
[2005] EWHC (QB) 1156 (Eng.), available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/
EWHC/QB/2005/1156.html.
18
Hearing, supra note 1, at 20 (written statement by Bruce D. Brown, Partner,
Baker & Hostetler, LLP).
19
Id.; Ehrenfeld, 518 F.3d at 103-04.
20
Ehrenfeld, 518 F.3d at 103-04.
21
Id. at 104.
22
Id.
23
Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz, 881 N.E.2d 830, 834 (N.Y. 2007).
24
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302 (a)(1) (McKinney 2008) (“[A]s to a cause of action arising
from any of the acts enumerated in this section, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction
over any non-domiciliary, or his executor or administrator, who in person or through an
agent: transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or
services in the state.”).
25
Ehrenfeld, 881 N.E.2d at 831.
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26

defendant, the case had to be dismissed.
While Dr. Ehrenfeld’s case generated a great deal of media
attention, her case is not exceptional. Throughout the world, journalists
are increasingly forced to defend themselves against libel suits,
particularly in the United Kingdom, where the libel laws are stricter
27
than those in their own country. Moreover, foreign courts readily
affirm jurisdiction over journalists if the material they publish is viewed
in those countries, thereby eviscerating American journalists’ reliance
28
on First Amendment protections.
The widespread use of the Internet expands this problem. Material
posted on the Internet can be accessed in any country. As a result, “the
actions of unrelated third parties – readers of articles online, online
book purchasers – substantiate jurisdiction in foreign defamation
29
disputes.” Because they are being exposed to suit in practically any
jurisdiction, American journalists must undertake the daunting task of
anticipating all the laws they may be subject to by virtue of the fact that
their material may land in a foreign jurisdiction. In effect, this nearly
impossible task results in the chilling of free speech for those who do
not want to face litigation in foreign jurisdictions.
In order to remedy this problem and effectively preserve First
Amendment principles, Congress enacted the Securing the Protection of
our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage Act (the
“SPEECH Act”). This Note will examine this federal response and its
effect on libel tourism. Part I of this Note briefly examines the history
and principles behind the First Amendment in the United States. Part II
articulates the different laws and policies that attract libel tourists to
England and other countries. In particular, Part II compares the libel
laws of the United States with popular libel plaintiff-friendly
jurisdictions, specifically England and Australia. Part II also compares
certain civil procedure principles within the United States and England.
Part III discusses the prevalence of libel tourism through relevant case
law and illustrations. In addition, Part III examines the chilling effects
of libel tourism on First Amendment principles, and Part IV discusses
26

See discussion of personal jurisdiction infra Part II B 1.
David Kohler, Forty Years After New York Times v. Sullivan: The Good, the
Bad, and the Ugly, 83 OR. L. REV. 1203, 1204-05 (2004).
28
See discussion of personal jurisdiction, particularly in the UK infra Part II B 1.
29
Heather Maly, Note, Publish at Your Own Risk or Don’t Publish at All: Forum
Shopping Trends in Libel Litigation Leave the First Amendment Un-Guaranteed, 14 J.L. &
POL’Y 883, 885 (2006).
27
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policy considerations and enforcement mechanisms in the United States.
Part V discusses state and federal responses to libel tourism, in
particular the New York Libel Terrorism Protection Act and the federal
SPEECH Act. Finally, Part VI analyzes what impact, if any, the
SPEECH Act will have on libel tourism. Specifically, Part VI examines
the policy and procedural perspectives of the legislation, and concludes
that the SPEECH Act is constitutionally the furthest the United States
can reach to protect American citizens from foreign defamation
judgments.
I. FIRST AMENDMENT THEORY AND DEFAMATION LAW
The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law . . .
30
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” This constitutional
31
protection holds a “near sacred place in American society” and “was
fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing
32
about of political and social changes desired by the people.” Freedom
of expression is an indispensible means to the discovery of truth and a
democratic self-government, in which “the greatest menace to freedom
33
is an inert people.” It is secured in our legal system to uphold the
expression and dissemination of ideas without fear of persecution by the
34
government.
The language of the First Amendment could be misread to suggest
that the rights protected are absolute; however, this would be a great
over-generalization. The tort of defamation provides restrictions on
35
what can be spoken and printed. On the other hand, American free
speech jurisprudence is rooted in the “fourth estate” principle, which
reflects the notion that the press imposes a critical check on
governmental powers by keeping the public informed, and that therefore

30

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Maly, supra note 29, at 889.
32
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
33
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
34
Sturtevant, supra note 3, at 272.
35
50 AM. JUR. 2D LIBEL AND SLANDER § 6 (defamation is a false publication that
causes injury to a person’s reputation, or exposing him to contempt, public hatred, ridicule,
shame or disgrace, or which affects him adversely in his trade or business); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568 (1977) (“Libel consists of the publication of
defamatory matter by written or printed words, by its embodiment in physical form or by
any other form of communication that has the potentially harmful qualities characteristic of
written or printed words.”).
31
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it must receive the utmost protection in its ability to report the news
36
without restraint. In the landmark case New York Times v. Sullivan, the
Supreme Court recognized that the First Amendment represents “a
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may
well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
37
attacks on government and public officials.” The Court noted that the
press protections demanded by the Constitution were an intentional
38
departure from the British form of government. In order to give the
press the “breathing space” essential to reporting on issues of public
concern, the Court conceded that the “erroneous statement is inevitable
39
in free debate” and thus placed strict limitations on libel suits. The
plaintiff has the burden of proving that the disputed statement was false,
and if the plaintiff is a public official, he must prove that the statement
was made with “actual malice,” which means the defendant had
knowledge that the statement was false, or displayed a reckless
40
disregard for the statement’s truth or falsity. The Constitution demands
that the plaintiff must display this high level of fault with “convincing
41
clarity.” Underlying the Court’s decision was the fear that any other
standard would deter “would-be critics of official conduct . . . from
voicing their criticism . . . because of doubt whether it can be proved in
42
court or fear of the expense of having to do so.”
The Court continued to provide heightened speech protections by
expanding the holding of New York Times through subsequent case law.
In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, the Court held that the principles
articulated in New York Times were also applicable to defamatory

36

Sarah Staveley-O’Carroll, Note, Libel Tourism Laws: Spoiling the Holiday and
Saving the First Amendment?, 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 252, 255-56 (2009).
37
This case concerned an advertisement in the New York Times on behalf of
several individuals and groups protesting a “wave of terror” against blacks involved in nonviolent demonstrations in the South. Plaintiff, one of three elected commissioners of the
City of Montgomery, Alabama, was in charge of the police department. He filed a libel
action against the newspaper and four black ministers whose names appeared in the ad,
claiming that the allegations against the Montgomery police defamed him personally. It was
uncontroverted that there were some inaccuracies in the two allegedly libelous paragraphs.
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256-58, 270 (1964).
38
Id. at 274.
39
Id. at 271.
40
Id. at 279-80.
41
Id. at 285-86.
42
Id. at 279.
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43

statements criticizing “public figures.” Although the Court declined to
extend the actual malice standard of New York Times to defamation of
individual persons who were neither public officials nor public figures,
the Court nevertheless rejected the English law of strict liability and
required a private plaintiff to show some degree of fault, with
44
negligence being the minimum. As a result, a plaintiff who is a public
official or figure has a much greater obstacle to overcome in satisfying
the constitutional requirements.
II. WHAT FEATURES ATTRACT LIBEL TOURISTS ABROAD?
45

London is often referred to as the “libel capital of the world” and
has become the most attractive destination for libel tourists across the
46
globe. While England has a very respectable legal system, there are
many reasons why libel tourists find England a hospitable sanctuary to
bring their grievances. First and foremost, England’s libel jurisprudence
values reputation, while the United States values freedom of expression.
As will be discussed, this shifts the burden to the defendant to prove the
truth of an allegedly defamatory statement. In addition, England’s rules
of civil procedure, most importantly the law of personal jurisdiction,
makes England a favorite destination for libel tourists.
A. Contrasting U.S. and English Libel Law
Freedom of expression is a fundamental element to democracy, but
countries differ in how they value this basic right. In the United States,
freedom of expression is accorded the highest value, and injury to one’s
reputation, although regrettable, is sometimes an inevitable consequence
47
of preserving this freedom. Conversely, in other countries, particularly
England, damage to one’s reputation may trump the value of free
expression. In these instances, some defamation laws permit the courts
to impose criminal sanctions on the accused.
43

Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967); see also Gertz v. Welch, 418
U.S. 323 (1974) (holding that private figures who report on matters of public concern are
not necessarily subject to the actual malice standard, but must be subject to some standard of
fault, negligence being the minimum).
44
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347; Hearing, supra note 1, at 47 (written statement by Laura
Handman, Partner, Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP).
45
Hearing, supra note 1, at 1.
46
Id.
47
Maly, supra note 29, at 888-889; see also discussion of First Amendment and
New York Times v. Sullivan, supra Part I.
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Of particular importance is the stark contrast between British and
American jurisprudence. While both countries value freedom of
expression, they balance the other interests – for instance reputation –
48
differently and thus reach conflicting outcomes. Britain remains highly
protective of an individual’s reputation and imposes much more rigid
requirements on media defendants, while the United States understands
49
that damage to reputation is an unavoidable consequence. This
dichotomy between the United States and Britain lies at the heart of the
trouble of libel tourism and contributes directly to the uncertainty
American authors and publishers face when deciding what to publish,
and in what jurisdiction they may be forced to defend a defamation suit,
thereby chilling their First Amendment rights.
1. English Libel Law
50

England’s defamation law can be seen as a “mirror image” of the
51
defamation law in the United States, which explains how England
became the “libel capital” and has attracted so many libel plaintiffs to
52
bring their grievances to England. England’s defamation law retains
many of the common law principles overturned in the United States by
53
New York Times and its progeny. Thus, any alleged defamatory
statement that adversely affects an individual’s reputation is prima facie
54
defamatory. Specifically, the burden of proof shifts from the plaintiff
to the defendant, where any alleged defamatory statement is presumed
55
false and the defense has the burden to prove its truth. In addition,
England does not impose any standard of fault, therefore, even if the
defendant believed the alleged defamatory statement to be true, he can
56
still be found liable for defamation. The only burden placed on the
plaintiff is to establish that the statement was directed to the plaintiff,
48
Hearing, supra note 1, at 46 (written statement by Laura Handman, Partner,
Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP).
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
See discussion of United States libel jurisprudence supra Part I.
52
Hearing, supra note 1, at 46 (written statement by Laura Handman, Partner,
Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP).
53
Todd W. Moore, Untying our Hands: The Case for Uniform Personal
Jurisdiction over “Libel Tourists,” 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 3207, 3212 (2009).
54
Hearing, supra note 1, at 46 (written statement by Laura Handman, Partner,
Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP).
55
Moore, supra note 53, at 3212.
56
Id.

GERNY FORMATTED UPDATED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

418

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

6/28/2012 1:59 PM

Vol. 36:2
57

was published by the defendant, and conveyed a defamatory meaning.
Because the alleged statements are presumed false, the defendant’s
only recourse is to demonstrate the truth of the statements or establish
58
an exception in order to prevail over the charges. The English courts
have acknowledged that there are some matters so important to the
public interest that the defendant does not have to face the high burden
59
of proving the truth of the underlying statement at issue. This is known
as the “fair comment” exception and may apply to communications
made by the defendant on matters of public interest; it also must be an
opinion that the author could reasonably communicate based on facts,
60
and made without malice. Although the fair comment exception can
relieve a defendant from the burden of proving the truth of the
underlying statement at issue, it gives far less protection than the laws in
61
the United States.
Another exception to England’s libel law is the absolute privilege
62
exception that applies to comments made by members of Parliament.
Members of the press can also claim this privilege “for fair and accurate
63
reporting on judicial proceedings.” In addition, England’s libel laws
recognize a qualified privilege when reporting on a government entity,
reasoning that “government bodies should be open to criticism and
64
these institutions should be unable to prohibit speech.” Nevertheless,
the application of this privilege is unclear, and is dependent on the
65
circumstances of each case.
2. Australian Libel Law
While England remains the “libel capital” of the world and the
main focus of libel tourism commentary, other countries also have
similar defamation laws that attract libel tourists to these countries. Like
57

Hearing, supra note 1, at 46 (written statement by Laura Handman, Partner,
Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP).
58
Maly, supra note 29, at 900.
59
Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd, [2001] 2 A.C. 127 (U.K.), available at
http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1999/45.html.
60
Maly, supra note 29, at 901.
61
Hearing, supra note 1, at 46 (written statement by Laura Handman, Partner,
Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP).
62
Maly, supra note 29, at 901.
63
Id.
64
Id.; see also Reynolds, supra note 59.
65
Maly, supra note 29, at 901-02.

GERNY FORMATTED UPDATED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2012

LIBEL TOURISM ABROAD

6/28/2012 1:59 PM

419

the United States, Australia’s legal roots are derived from the English
66
common law. However, where the United States deviated from
67
England’s defamation law, Australia continued to follow its example.
Thus, Australia holds reputation in higher regard than freedom of
68
expression.
In addition, Australia does not have any similar standard akin to
the New York Times requirement that public figures must demonstrate
69
that the defendant acted with actual malice. Australian lawmakers
support the lack of a different requirement for public figures by arguing
that it would unjustly burden those in the public eye simply because of
70
their status. Therefore, like England, the alleged defamatory statement
is presumed false, and the burden is on the defendant to prove its truth,
71
in which there is no burden of fault.
As an illustration, in Dow Jones v. Gutnick, Gutnick sued Dow
72
Jones, publisher of the Wall Street Journal and Barron’s Magazine. An
edition of Barron’s Online, found on the Wall Street Journal’s website
included an article titled “Unholy Gains” that allegedly defamed
73
Gutnick. In the suit, Dow Jones argued that Australia’s libel laws
chilled U.S. notions of free speech and that the Australian court did not
74
75
have jurisdiction over the matter. The High Court responded by
affirming the judgment, reasoning that since the Internet allowed for
Australian subscriptions to the website, and that “common law adapts
76
even to radically different environments,” then Dow Jones could
rightfully be bound by the libel laws of Australia.

66

Sturtevant, supra note 3, at 281.
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 281-82.
71
Id. at 282.
72
Dow Jones and Co. v. Gutnick, [2002] HCA 56 (Austl.).
73
Id. at 2.
74
Sturtevant, supra note 3, at 282.
75
The High Court of Australia is the final court of appeal in Australia. Operation
of the High Court, HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA, http://www.hcourt.gov.au/about/operation
76
Dow Jones and Co. v. Gutnick, [2002] HCA 56, 90 (Austl.).
67
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B. Contrasting U.S. and British Civil Procedure
1. Personal Jurisdiction
As mentioned in the Introduction, a U.S. court cannot adjudicate a
77
case without first obtaining personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
This obstacle serves as the primary barrier in deciding whether a U.S.
78
court can adjudicate the enforceability of a foreign judgment. In order
to acquire personal jurisdiction over the foreign party, the court must
comply with the forum’s statutory requirements and the due process
79
requirements of the Constitution. To satisfy these requirements, the
court must apply either an applicable federal statute or a state long-arm
statute. A federal statute or the forum state’s long arm-statute indicates
under what conditions a foreign party can be hauled into court in a
80
particular forum. At the same time, the state’s basis for exercising
personal jurisdiction must comply with the constitutional standard of
81
minimum contacts.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment restricts a
court’s ability to exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign party. Due
process requires that the defendant have “certain minimum contacts”
with the forum state such that the suit “does not offend ‘traditional
82
notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” What constitutes
minimum contacts has been an issue of debate for the Supreme Court
over the years; however, the enduring rationale is to protect a defendant
from the inconvenience of traveling to a foreign forum to defend against
the suit, and to make certain that states do not overextend their
83
sovereign powers. However, the issue of sovereignty may play a
greater part in international jurisdictional questions. In those situations a
court may employ comity principles to refrain from meddling with
84
another country’s fair exercise of jurisdiction.
77

Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
Moore, supra note 53, at 3222.
79
FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A) and (C).
80
Moore, supra note 53, at 3222.
81
See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (“[D]ue process requires only that in order to
subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of
the forum, he have certain minimum contacts.”).
82
Id. (quoting Miliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
83
Moore, supra note 53, at 3223; see also World Wide Volkswagen Corp v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
84
See discussion of comity and reciprocity infra Part IV.
78
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If a defendant cannot assert “continuous and systematic . . .
85
contacts” with the forum state sufficient for personal jurisdiction, the
defendant can also claim specific jurisdiction – jurisdiction based
exclusively on the defendant’s contacts arising from the plaintiff’s
86
claim. However, it is important to note that it is the defendant’s
contacts with the forum state that are relevant to the court’s inquiry
87
concerning whether proper jurisdiction exists. The defendant’s act
must “purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its
88
laws[;]” this is also known as the purposeful availment doctrine.
Perhaps most troubling is how to reconcile the standard of
minimum contacts and traditional geographic boundaries with the
Internet, since the Internet has created a world unrestricted by
traditional geographic limits. Specific jurisdiction has been applied to
the Internet context, whereby the defendant’s Internet activity must
89
expressly target the forum state. The mere act of placing material on
the Internet is not sufficient to sustain a finding of personal jurisdiction;
rather, the defendant must have the requisite intent to target the readers
90
of the forum state. In Young v. New Haven Advocate, a recent case that
reviewed the purposeful availment doctrine’s application to the Internet,
the Fourth Circuit looked at the advertisements and contents of the
newspaper’s website, as well as the content of the article in question, to
determine whether a Connecticut newspaper intended to target a
91
Virginia audience. The Court then concluded that since the
advertisements and other content on the website, coupled with the local
content of the specific article, were all aimed at a Connecticut audience,
it was unreasonable for the newspaper to anticipate being hauled into
92
court in Virginia, and therefore jurisdiction was not proper.
Another difficult issue applies to defamation. Defamation is a nonphysical tort, without specific geographical boundaries, in which the
method of publication (such as investigating, writing, printing and

85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92

Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984).
Id. at 414 n.8.
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
Id. (citing Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319).
Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d. 256, 262-63 (4th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 263.
Id. at 263-64.
Id.
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disseminating) may occur in many different jurisdictions.
Consequently, the jurisdictional issues do not neatly comport with the
94
standard for minimum contacts. An example of this problem is
95
illustrated in Calder v. Jones.
In Calder, the National Enquirer, Inc., a Florida corporation with
its principal place of business in Florida, published an allegedly
96
defamatory article about Calder, a California resident. The National
Enquirer publishes a national weekly newspaper, with a circulation of
over 5 million, and approximately 600,000 of those copies were sold in
97
California. The article in dispute alleged that Calder drank so heavily
98
as to interfere with her professional responsibilities. In the suit, the
National Enquirer argued that jurisdiction was not proper in California.
Nonetheless the Court held that because “the brunt of the harm,”
regarding both the emotional distress and injury to reputation claims,
99
was suffered in California, jurisdiction was proper. In other words,
jurisdiction was appropriate “based on the ‘effects’ of [the National
100
Enquirer’s Florida conduct in California.” Despite the fact that the
Court clearly expanded the purposeful availment doctrine, it is
questionable whether the effects test applies outside the scope of
101
intentional torts.
Like American courts, an English court will find jurisdiction
102
proper if the defendant caused a tort to occur in the forum. However,
where the United States courts require the allegedly defamatory
statements to target the particular forum, the English courts do not. As a
103
result, based on the multiple publication rule, the English courts have
had no trouble finding jurisdiction even if the publication consisted of
104
merely a few Internet hits or hard copies purchased online in England.

93

Maly, supra note 29, at 910.
Id.
95
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
96
Id. at 784-85.
97
Id. at 785.
98
Id. at 789 .
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Moore, supra note 53, at 3226.
102
Staveley-O’Carroll, supra note 36, at 262.
103
See discussion of the multiple publication rule that every online hit constitutes a
separate actionable tort discussed infra Part II B 3.
104
Staveley-O’Carroll, supra note 36, at 262.
94
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Recently, the English courts have become more willing to assert
jurisdiction based on the belief that, with the growth of the Internet,
105
plaintiffs have a greater interest in defending their reputations. In King
106
v. Lewis, the English Court of Appeals noted that it is “the publisher’s
choice of a global medium” and thus “the Internet publisher’s very
choice of a ubiquitous medium, at least suggests a robust approach to
the question of forum: a global publisher should not be too fastidious as
107
to the part of the globe where he is made a libel defendant.” In that
case, the English court allowed Don King, a boxing promoter and
Florida resident, to sue a New York resident in England based on a
108
libelous statement made on a California website. The Court reasoned
that since boxing was very popular in England, Don King had a
reputation to protect there, and that the publisher’s choice to post the
109
article on a global medium exposed himself to a global forum.
2. Statute of Limitations
While not demanding of much explanation, the comparison
between the statute of limitations in the United States and England is
important. In the United States the statute of limitations begins to run
from the first publication of the statement, albeit the publication may
110
remain on sale or posted on the Internet. In England, however, the
statute of limitations runs until the publication is no longer available in
111
print format or online.
3. Single vs. Multiple Publication Rule
Related to the statute of limitations issue is the disparity between
the United States and England’s publication rule. The difference
between the statute of limitations results from what the American and
English courts consider a “publication.” Most U.S. states follow the
“single publication rule,” which states that “[a]ny one edition of a book
or newspaper, or any one radio or television broadcast, exhibition of a
105

Id.
King
v.
Lewis,
[2004]
EWCA
Civ.
1329,
available
at
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2004/1329.html.
107
Id. at [31].
108
Id. at [2]-[4].
109
Id. at [13], [27]-[32].
110
Hearing, supra note 1, at 48 (written statement by Laura Handman, Partner,
Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP).
111
Id.
106
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motion picture or similar aggregate communication is a single
112
publication,” and can give rise to only one action for defamation.
Accordingly, a plaintiff can only bring one action, even if the harm was
113
suffered in numerous jurisdictions. The courts adopted this rule to
protect publishers from facing lawsuits in multiple jurisdictions and
from the “undue harassment” that may result because of mass
114
publications. The single publication rule also applies to the Internet
context. Thus, the statute of limitations on the article begins to run when
115
it is first published on the website.
England adheres to the “multiple publication rule,” which states
that every publication of the disputed material gives rise to an
actionable tort, even if the statement appears in multiple jurisdictions
116
throughout the world. This rule was announced in 1849 in The Duke of
117
Brunswick v. Harmer, where the Court held that a purchase of a
seventeen-year-old back issue of a newspaper constituted a new
“publication” and therefore gave rise to an actionable tort, regardless of
118
the original publication date. As a result of this archaic rule, a single
119
Internet hit will constitute a publication for libel purposes. However,
due to the absurdity of this result, the Ministry of Justice sought a
review of the rule, and in March 2010 found that it was appropriate to
introduce a single publication rule, while leaving discretion to extend
120
the time period if necessary. The detailed provisions necessary to
administer the operation of the single publication rule are currently
121
under consideration.

112
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577A(3) (1977); see definition of
publication, supra note 4.
113
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577A(4)(b).
114
Staveley-O’Carroll, supra note 36, at 260.
115
Robert D. Sack, Statutes of Limitation and the Single Publication Rule, P.L.I.
SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS § 7.2.1 (2011); see, e.g.,
Firth v. State, 775 N.E.2d 463, 465-66 (N.Y. 2002) (holding that a libel claim was barred by
New York’s one-year statute of limitations where the disputed speech was initially posted
on the Internet more than a year before plaintiff filed suit).
116
Staveley-O’Carroll, supra note 36, at 260-61.
117
The Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer, (1849) 117 Eng. Rep. 175 (Q.B.).
118
Id. at 176-77.
119
Staveley-O’Carroll, supra note 36, at 261.
120
Defamation and the internet: the multiple publication rule, MINISTRY OF
JUSTICE (2010), http://www.justice.gov.uk/consultations/defamation-internet-consultationpaper.htm.
121
Id.
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4. Fee Shifting
Fee shifting rules provide a considerable incentive for libel
plaintiffs to bring suit in England. In the United States each party to the
litigation pays their own attorney’s fees, unless the statute or contract
122
grants specific authority to collect those fees. The prevailing party
123
does not collect attorney’s fees unless authorized by law.
On the other hand, under fee shifting in England the losing party
124
bears all of the costs related to the litigation. This is significant in the
libel context because the defendant bears the burden of proof, and the
likelihood of a plaintiff victory is substantial. Furthermore, the cost of
litigation in England can run into the millions of dollars because most
125
libel cases require multiple attorneys.
5. Forum Non Conveniens
One possible solution for a media defendant facing a defamation
suit in England is to argue that the suit should be dismissed on forum
non conveniens grounds. This legal doctrine allows for dismissal where
personal jurisdiction is proper, but the practicalities of facing litigation
in the forum places an undue burden on the defendant and thus the case
126
should be transferred to a more convenient court. However, in effect,
this procedural device does little to restrain the reach of English courts,
because it is dependent on the discretion of the judge, and British judges
127
view their jurisdiction broadly. British courts justify jurisdiction based
on the argument that the tort occurred there, even when the connection
128
to England is tenuous. They have also indicated that because the
action would most likely not “survive” in the United States, “there
would seem little point in addressing how much more convenient [a
129
U.S. forum] would be.”

122

FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d).
Id.
124
Hearing, supra note 1, at 49 (written statement by Laura Handman, Partner,
Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP).
125
Id.; see also Staveley-O’Carroll, supra note 36, at 259.
126
Hearing, supra note 1, at 21 (written statement by Bruce D. Brown, Partner,
Baker & Hostetler, LLP); see generally Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
127
Staveley-O’Carroll, supra note 36, at 264.
128
Id.; see also Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz, 881 N.E.2d 830, 832 (N.Y. 2007) (only
23 copies sold in UK but still sustained jurisdiction because the tort occurred there).
129
King, supra note 106, at 18.
123
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III. PREVALENCE AND CHILLING EFFECTS OF LIBEL
TOURISM ON FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTED SPEECH
While the comparison of libel laws and jurisdictional issues
between the United States and England depicts an undoubtedly sharp
divergence in their approaches to defamation, and reveals why England
is a significantly more attractive venue to bring a defamation suit, it is
important to ascertain just how prevalent this “legal loophole” is and
who its victims are. Is the intentional and strategic decision to forum
shop and file suit outside the United States, in actuality, a problem to be
remedied by federal legislation, or does Ehrenfeld stand out as an
outlier, an atypical case with an extreme set of facts?
A foreign defamation judgment may have wide-ranging
implications. Arguably, the one most concerning and troubling for
media defendants is its ability to chill their protected First Amendment
free speech rights. Libel tourism’s chilling effect cuts off the free flow
of information that should reach the public, and instead silences authors
130
and journalists. Journalists are often compelled to self-censor their
speech to ensure that their statements not only conform to the standards
of the First Amendment, but also that they satisfy the more “stifling
131
strictures of English libel law.” Although it is difficult to evaluate if
and how libel tourism may chill free expression because it is impossible
to catalogue what has been held from publication, testimony from
prominent media lawyers indicates just how far reaching the chilling
effect is, particularly on writings about controversial international
132
subjects.
Media lawyers, such as Bruce D. Brown, partner at Baker &
Hostetler, LLC, who review their clients’ material before it is published,
have firsthand knowledge of how libel tourism has altered the “legal
133
landscape.” For example, more than a decade ago, Mr. Brown’s
colleagues represented journalist Craig Unger in a libel suit filed by
134
Robert McFarlane against Esquire magazine. The alleged defamatory
statement concerned an article entitled “October Sunrise,” which
130
Hearing, supra note 1, at 23 (written statement by Bruce D. Brown, Partner,
Baker & Hostetler, LLP).
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id. at 24; see also McFarlane v. Esquire Magazine, 74 F.3d 1296 (D.C. Cir.
1996).
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discussed efforts to negotiate the release of the American hostages in
135
Iran. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit found in Mr.
Unger’s favor, indicating that there was no evidence to suggest the
material in the article was false. However, approximately a decade later,
Mr. Unger’s British publisher canceled their plans to bring to England
his book, House of Bush, House of Saud: The Secret Relationship
136
Between the World’s Two Most Powerful Dynasties, a U.S. bestseller.
A potential suit by the members of the Saudi Royal Family prevented
the publication of Mr. Unger’s book even though it was cleared for
137
publication and published in the United States.
As a further illustration, Laura Handman, partner at Davis Wright
Tremaine, LLP testified that the U.S. publishers her firm represents
repeatedly receive letters on behalf of U.S. celebrities and
businesspeople from both U.S. and British law firms threatening
lawsuits in England if the allegedly defamatory statements are
138
published. If the work has already been published, U.S. publishers are
eager to settle the claims because of the high economic risk, and the
139
knowledge that the claim will likely succeed in England.
Consequently, while media lawyers may feel reassured that their clients
are well protected by the First Amendment in the United States they
must also counsel their clients about the risks of their work being
exposed in England and the high probability of eventual litigation.
Furthermore, Dr. Ehrenfeld experienced first-hand the chilling
effects that the English judgment against her had on her U.S. protected
free speech rights. She testified that she had many “sleepless nights”
worrying that Mahfouz would come to New York to enforce the English
140
judgment against her. Although he never attempted to enforce the
judgment in the United States, the potential that he would “left it
hanging over [her] head like a sword of Damocles,” thereby
141
exacerbating the chilling effect. In addition, Ehrenfeld testified that
the English judgment affected her ability to publish, and to travel to
135

Hearing, supra note 1, at 24 (written statement by Bruce D. Brown, Partner,
Baker & Hostetler, LLP).
136
Id.
137
Id. at 56 (written statement by Laura Handman, Partner, Davis Wright
Tremaine, LLP).
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Id. at 12 (testimony of Rachel Ehrenfeld).
141
Hearing, supra note 1, at 12.
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England, lest she be arrested to enforce the judgment against her.
143
Those who once “courted” her now refuse to publish her. Ehrenfeld
was not Mahfouz’s only victim; he has obtained settlements in nearly
forty cases, and boasts about his conquests on his website, thereby
144
silencing and intimidating any of his would-be critics.
IV. PRINCIPLES OF COMITY AND ENFORCEMENT OF
FOREIGN DEFAMATION JUDGMENTS

While states in the United States enforce the judgments of other
states under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution, there is
no such requirement for foreign money judgments, and there is no
federal law that mandates recognition and enforcement of foreign
145
judgments in the United States. In addition, the United States is not a
party to any treaties or international agreements dealing with the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, although Congress
does have the authority to enact legislation that would prohibit the
enforcement of foreign judgments if those judgments were found to be
146
inconsistent with the First Amendment.
Curiously, the enforcement and recognition of foreign country
147
judgments has largely been left to the states. Many, but not all, states
have adopted the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition
148
Act; however the adoptions are not consistent. For example, some
states have incorporated the requirement of reciprocity that a foreign
judgment will be recognized and enforced in the United States so long
as a U.S. judgment would be enforced in a foreign country under similar

142

Id; see discussion of enforcement of judgments infra Part IV.
Hearing, supra note 1, at 14 (written statement by Rachel Ehrenfeld).
144
Id.; Bin Mahfouz posts on his website how often he brings defamation suits
against various American authors. BIN MAHFOUZ, http://www.binmahfouz.info/
en_index.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2012).
145
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 181-82 (1895).
146
Hearing, supra note 1, at 52 (written statement by Laura Handman, Partner,
Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP) (indicating that the Hague Convention on Choice Agreements
would require Convention signatories to recognize judgments rendered by a court in another
signatory country, and would apply to defamation judgments, but the United States has not
yet ratified the Convention).
147
Id. at 62 (written statement by Linda J. Silberman, Professor, New York
University School of Law).
148
UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT (1962); UNIF.
FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT (2005).
143
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149

circumstances. Other states do not have this requirement; the adoption
of the Uniform Act is left to the discretion of the states, and as a result,
150
a foreign judgment may be enforced in one state, but not in another. In
sum, there is no uniform American law governing the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments.
At the same time, the United States may enforce a foreign
judgment despite the fact there is no law mandating enforcement. The
underlying rationale of recognizing and enforcing foreign judgments
against U.S. parties is the general principle that in order to be enforced
in the United States, the judgment must have been achieved through a
151
fair and impartial process. This principle has been developed by the
notion of comity – “the recognition which one nation allows within its
territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation,
having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the
152
rights of its own citizens.” In other words, the doctrine of comity is
153
meant to foster friendly international relations. On the other hand, a
foreign judgment may be refused recognition if the judgment or cause
of action is repugnant to the public policy of the United States or the
154
state where recognition is wanted. In particular, U.S. courts have
refused to recognize foreign defamation judgments when the
enforcement would encroach on traditional First Amendment rights, and
155
is thus repugnant to public policy.
In Bachchan v. India Abroad, a Swedish daily newspaper reported
that Swiss authorities had frozen the bank account of Indian national
156
Ajitabh Bachchan. A small New York publication, India Abroad,
transmitted the story to India and printed and distributed the story in
149

Id.
Id. at 63.
151
Moore, supra note 53, at 3217.
152
Hilton, supra note 145, at 163-64.
153
Id. at 165.
154
See e.g. UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(b)(3)
(1962) (“[A] foreign judgment need not be recognized if [the cause of action] [claim for
relief] on which the judgment is based is repugnant to the public policy of this state”); see
also UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(c)(3) (2005) (“[A]
court of this state need not recognize a foreign-country judgment if the foreign-country
judgment or the [cause of action] [claim for relief] on which the foreign-country judgment is
based is repugnant to the public policy of this state or of the United States.”).
155
Hearing, supra note 1, at 64 (written statement by Linda J. Silberman,
Professor, New York University School of Law).
156
Bachchan v. India Abroad Publ’ns, Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661, 661 (Sup. Ct.
1992).
150
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England and New York. Bachchan, a well-known public figure in India
and around the world, sued both the Swedish newspaper and India
157
Abroad for libel in England. Even though the primary distribution
occurred overwhelmingly in the United States, and only 1,000 copies
were distributed in England, a judgment was entered against India
Abroad, where it was held strictly liable for £40,000 for “publishing a
158
story based on another paper’s ‘unwitting’ error.”
Although Bachchan was victorious in England, he had less good
fortune in the United States. After his win in England, Bachchan
instituted a proceeding in New York to enforce the English judgment
159
against India Abroad. The Court declined to enforce the judgment on
public policy grounds, stating that the First Amendment “would be
seriously jeopardized by entry of [a] foreign libel judgment[s] granted
pursuant to standards deemed appropriate in England but considered
antithetical to the protections afforded [to] the press by the U.S.
160
Constitution.”
The Maryland high court reached the analogous conclusion that a
foreign libel judgment contravened the First Amendment and precluded
recognition of the judgment. In Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, Telnikoff, an
English citizen, complained in an op-ed column published in London’s
Daily Telegraph, that the BBC’s Russian Service employed too many
“Russian-speaking national minorities” but not enough of “‘those who
associate themselves ethnically, spiritually or religiously with the
161
Russian people.’” Matusevitch, a Maryland resident, responded with
162
an angry letter also published in the Telegraph. The letter protested
what he considered Telnikoff as advocating for a “switch from
professional testing to a blood test” and was “stressing his racialist
recipe by claiming that no matter how high the standards and integrity
‘of ethnically alien’ people Russian staff might be, they should be
163
dismissed.” In the United States, the letter would have been
considered the “heated hyperbole uttered in the course of public debate
that is protected by the First Amendment in this country as non157

Id.
Id. at 662; Hearing, supra note 1, at 52-53 (written statement by Laura
Handman, Partner, Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP).
159
Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 662.
160
Id. at 664.
161
Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230, 233 (Md. 1997).
162
Id. at 565-66.
163
Id. at 566.
158
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164

actionable opinion.” However, the English jury concluded otherwise,
and found that the letter expressed the “fact” that Telnikoff was a
165
racialist, and awarded Telnikoff £240,000.
Telnikoff then sought to enforce the judgment in the United States.
“The United States District Court for the District of Columbia entered
judgment for Matusevitch,” concluding that the “English libel judgment
was ‘repugnant to the public policy of the state’ of Maryland and the
166
United States. After Telnikoff appealed the district court’s decision,
the D.C. Circuit certified the question whether Telnikoff’s foreign
judgment was repugnant to the public policy of Maryland to Maryland’s
167
highest court. The Maryland Court of Appeals answered in the
affirmative, stating:
[A]t the heart of the First Amendment . . . is the recognition of the
fundamental importance of the free flow of ideas and opinions on
matters of public interest and concern. The importance of that free
flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public concern precludes
168
Maryland recognition of Telnikoff’s English libel judgment.

Aside from the public policy defense, a party may also sue for
169
declaratory relief, pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, that a
foreign judgment is unenforceable in a U.S. court. The court will
“declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party” and
the judgment for her “shall have the force and effect of a final judgment
170
or decree and shall be reviewable as such.” However, this provision
does not provide for any further jurisdictional powers upon U.S. courts,
thus personal jurisdiction remains a complex threshold matter.

164
Hearing, supra note 1, at 53-54 (2009) (written statement by Laura Handman,
Partner, Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP).
165
Telnikoff, 347 Md. at 571.
166
Id. at 572.
167
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia held that the cause
of action underlying the English libel judgment was “repugnant to the public policy of the
State within the meaning of Maryland’s Uniform Foreign-Money Judgments Recognition
Act” and that “recognition of the foreign judgment under principles of comity would be
repugnant to the public policies of the State of Maryland and the United States.”
Alternatively, the District Court held that recognition and enforcement would violate the
First and Fourteenth Amendments. Telnikoff appealed to the United States Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit, which certified the question of whether the English judgment was
repugnant to the public policy of the state of Maryland. Id. at 572-73.
168
Id. at 602.
169
See 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2006).
170
Id.
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In Bachchan and Telnikoff, the states of New York and Maryland
concluded that recognition of foreign libel judgments in the United
States impaired the public policy of New York and Maryland, as well as
of the United States. However, a more recent effort to declare a foreign
libel judgment unenforceable in the United States proved unsuccessful.
The New York Court of Appeals in Ehrenfeld, while acknowledging the
problem of libel tourism, determined that Mahfouz’s contact with New
York could not establish a proper basis for jurisdiction, and therefore
Ehrenfeld’s argument to expand New York’s long-arm statute must be
171
directed to the legislature.
V. RESPONSES TO LIBEL TOURISM
It was evident from the Ehrenfeld decision that to combat the
problems of libel tourism effectively, a legislative response was crucial.
The decision prompted a national public outcry and united free speech
172
advocates to fight on Ehrenfeld’s behalf. New York responded with
173
the Libel Terrorism Protection Act and other states were quick to
174
follow with similar versions of their own. In August 2010, the
SPEECH Act, a federal answer to libel tourism, was signed into law by
175
President Barack Obama.
A. States’ Responses
Motivated by the Ehrenfeld decision, the New York legislature
responded by enacting the Libel Terrorism Protection Act (often dubbed
176
“Rachel’s Law”) and amending their jurisdictional statute. First, the
Act amended New York’s version of their Uniform Act and provided
that a defamation judgment rendered outside the United States will not
171
Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz, 881 N.E.2d 830, 834-37 (N.Y. 2007); see discussion
of state’s responses infra Part V; see also discussion of personal jurisdiction supra Part II B
1.
172
Adam Cohen, ‘Libel Tourism’: When Freedom of Speech Takes a Holiday,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/15/opinion/
15mon4.html.
173
See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5304(b)(8) (McKinney 2009).
174
For example, Illinois passed a similar version of the New York Act. See ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/12-621(b)(7) (2009).
175
See Securing the Protection of our Enduring and Established Constitutional
Heritage Act, Pub. L. No. 111-223, 124 Stat. 2380 (2010) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 410105) (2010)).
176
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5304(b)(8) (McKinney 2009); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a) (McKinney
2009).
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be enforced in New York courts unless the court in New York
concludes that the defamation law applied by the foreign court provides
“at least as much protection for freedom of speech and press . . . as
would be provided by both the United States and New York
177
constitutions.” Since virtually “no other jurisdiction provides as high a
level of protection for speech as the United States,” the Act disables
178
almost every foreign defamation judgment.
Second, the Act amended New York’s long-arm statute by
attaching jurisdiction to foreign defendants, so long as the allegedly
defamatory publication was published in New York, the domestic
plaintiff is a resident of New York and is amenable to jurisdiction in
New York, or may have to take action in New York to comply with the
179
judgment. This extension of jurisdiction in effect provides that no
territorial nexus between the foreign defendant and the domestic
plaintiff is required. As a result, a domestic plaintiff can bring an action
for declaratory relief with much greater ease and can seek to preempt an
enforcement suit.
Soon after, Illinois followed suit. Taking the New York bill as a
model, Illinois amended its version of the Uniform Foreign MoneyJudgments Recognition Act. The Illinois law extended long-arm
jurisdiction over libel tourists, and provided grounds for non180
enforcement of foreign defamation judgments.
B. Federal Response
Upon the urging of media lawyers, legislators, legal commentators,
and other lobbying groups, the Securing the Protection of our Enduring
and Established Constitutional Heritage Act or “SPEECH Act” was
181
enacted and signed into law by President Obama on August 10, 2010.
The purpose is to prohibit recognition and enforcement of foreign
defamation judgments against United States’ authors and publishers, as
well as certain foreign judgments against the providers of interactive
computer services, in other words, to prevent libel tourism. The
SPEECH Act operates as both “a shield and a sword to protect [United
177

N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5304(b)(8) (McKinney 2009).
Staveley-O’Carroll, supra note 36, at 276.
179
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a) (McKinney 2009).
180
735 ILL. COMP. STAT, 5/12-621(b)(7) (2009); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT, 5/2209(b)(5) (2009).
181
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 4101-05.
178

GERNY FORMATTED UPDATED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

434

6/28/2012 1:59 PM

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

Vol. 36:2

182

States’ citizens] from foreign defamation judgments.” The “shield”
feature in the law permits an American defendant to remain passive,
given that a foreign defamation judgment cannot be enforced in the
United States unless the judgment holder meets the requirements of the
SPEECH Act. It also acts as a “sword,” because it creates a cause of
action for declaratory relief in federal court to challenge the
enforceability of the foreign defamation judgment.
The “shield” aspect of the SPEECH Act sets forth a three-pronged
approach. In an action to enforce the foreign judgment, the person
seeking to enforce the judgment must first prove that the foreign court’s
application of their defamation law provided at least as much protection
as the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, and the
constitution and law of the state where the domestic court resides; or
that the American defendant would have been liable anyway under the
183
state’s libel law. Second, where applicable, the defendant must prove
that the foreign defamation judgment is consistent with Section 230 of
184
the Communications Act of 1934. Finally, the foreign defendant must
prove that the foreign court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over the
media defendant comported with the U.S. Constitution’s due process
185
requirements. If a foreign defendant cannot meet these requirements,
the state or federal court cannot recognize or enforce the foreign
186
defamation judgment.
The SPEECH Act applies to both state and federal courts;
however, a defendant has the discretion to remove the case to federal
187
court with no amount in controversy requirement. The law also
provides an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees to the party opposing
188
recognition or enforcement of the foreign defamation judgment. This
provision is one-sided, and only provides attorneys’ fees to the party

182
Jennifer A. Mansfield, New Federal Law Protects Authors, Interactive
Computer Services from Foreign Defamation Judgments, HOLLAND & KNIGHT (Sept. 22,
2010), available at http://www.hklaw.com/
id24660/PublicationId2984/ReturnId31/contentid55120/.
183
28 U.S.C. § 4102(a)(1)(A)-(B).
184
28 U.S.C. § 4102 (c); Section 230 provides immunity from liability for
providers and users of an interactive computer service who publish information by third
parties. Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (1996).
185
28 U.S.C. § 4102 (b).
186
Id.
187
28 U.S.C. § 4103.
188
28 U.S.C. § 4105.
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189

opposing enforcement.
190
The SPEECH Act can also act as a “sword.” It provides that any
U.S. person may bring an action in federal court for a declaratory
judgment that the foreign defamation judgment is repugnant to the U.S.
191
Constitution (the First Amendment) or the laws of the United States.
192
Additionally, this provision can also serve as a “double-edged sword,”
in which the law provides for nationwide service of process, thus
making it easier to obtain personal jurisdiction over a foreign
193
defendant. On the other side, though, is the requirement that the
domestic plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the foreign
194
defamation law is repugnant. In addition, it appears that the attorneys’
fees provision only applies in an action “to enforce a foreign judgment
195
for defamation,” not for declaratory judgments. Under the Act,
declaratory judgment actions seek to declare the foreign defamation
judgment invalid, not to enforce it; therefore, it seems to only apply
196
when the media defendant “acts solely in a defensive manner.”
VI. IMPACT OF THE SPEECH ACT
The SPEECH Act is a national response to libel tourism. The
issues and illustrations described earlier indicate that libel tourism is a
global problem in need of a national remedy. However, in order to
continue to foster friendly international relations and remain respectful
of other countries’ sovereignty, federal legislation needs to carefully
balance the interest of protecting American citizens’ First Amendment
free speech rights on the one hand, while also being mindful to not
overly intrude upon another country’s jurisdiction. The SPEECH Act
provides this remedy. Nevertheless, it is uncertain whether the SPEECH
Act will have the intended effect, because the balance provides gaps
whereby a U.S. person facing litigation abroad may not have the
SPEECH Act as protection. Moreover, the problem of libel tourism is
international in scope; thus, the most effective solution must be
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196

Id.
Mansfield, supra note 180.
28 U.S.C. § 4104(a)(1).
Mansfield, supra note 180.
28 U.S.C. § 4104(b).
28 U.S.C. § 4102(a)(2).
28 U.S.C. § 4105.
Mansfield, supra note 180.
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197

international as well. Despite this, the SPEECH Act provides a
national solution to libel tourism, and reaches as far as permitted by the
U.S. Constitution.
A. Libel Perspective
One troubling feature of the SPEECH Act is that it does not define
198
who specifically is a libel tourist. However, in Congress’ findings it is
clear that the SPEECH Act expressly refers to the problem of persons
“obstructing the free expression rights of United States authors and
199
publishers.” In addition, the cause of action for declaratory relief
directly references “Any United States person against whom a foreign
200
judgment is entered.” Thus, it is evident that the SPEECH Act is
limited to those libel plaintiffs who initiate litigation abroad against
United States persons for the purpose of capitalizing on the foreign
country’s plaintiff friendly libel laws. As an illustration, the SPEECH
Act would not apply to an Englishman who has assets in the United
201
States, and is sued by another Englishman in England. Because the
SPEECH Act directly references United States persons, the Englishman
faced with a lawsuit in England is not a United States person as defined
202
by the SPEECH Act.

197
Justin S. Hemlepp, Recent Development: “Rachel’s Law” Wraps New York’s
Long-Arm Around Libel Tourists; Will Congress Follow Suit?, 17 J. TRANSNAT’L L. &
POL’Y 387, 391 (2008).
198
The SPEECH Act only references in its findings that “[s]ome persons are
obstructing the free expression rights of United States authors and publishers . . . by seeking
out foreign jurisdictions that do not provide the full extent of free-speech protections to
authors and publishers that are available in the United States, and suing a United States
author or publisher in that foreign jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 4101-05.
199
28 U.S.C. §§ 4101-05 (emphasis added).
200
28 U.S.C. § 4104(a)(1) (emphasis added).
201
Hearing, supra note 1, at 90 (Letter from John J. Walsh, Carter Ledyard &
Milburn, LLP) (discussing his concern that the proposed bill, H.R. 6164 would also bar
enforcement of an Englishman’s English libel judgment against a fellow Englishman who
has assets in the United States needed to satisfy the judgment).
202
“The term ‘United States person’ means—
(A) a United States citizen;
(B) an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States;
(C) an alien lawfully residing in the United States at the time that the speech that is the
subject of the foreign defamation action was researched, prepared, or disseminated; or
(D) a business entity incorporated in, or with its primary location or place of operation in,
the United States.”
28 U.S.C. § 4101(6).
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Another problem arises. What if the defamation suit is based on a
meritorious claim that an American person or publication sincerely
defamed the libel plaintiff? For example, what if an American is sued in
England for passing out leaflets in Piccadilly Circus that allegedly
defamed an English person? Can this United States person come to the
United States and seek declaratory relief that the foreign judgment is
unenforceable? The answer must be no. Based on the spirit and
language of the SPEECH Act, it is evident that Congress was referring
to those libel plaintiffs who purposely seek out foreign countries for
their libel laws and when the allegedly defamatory statements have little
203
or no connection to the forum where litigation is initiated. The
jurisdictional and declaratory relief provisions of the SPEECH Act
provide a means to distinguish between colorable claims that are of
legitimate interest to foreign courts and those that are merely abusive.
Most significantly, the SPEECH Act will serve as a solution to the
chilling effect that libel tourism has had on so many American
publishers and journalists. If an American finds him or herself in the
position of defending a defamation suit abroad, he or she can default on
204
the suit and seek declaratory relief in the United States. Since the
United States’ libel laws favor freedom of expression rather than
damage to reputation, it is likely that a U.S. court will find that the
foreign court’s application of their defamation law does not comport
with the First Amendment, especially if the defamation suit is initiated
205
in England.
In addition, the SPEECH Act may have a deterrent effect on libel
tourists. If the libel plaintiff is interested in seeking a money judgment
from a media defendant who does not have assets in the foreign forum,
the libel tourist may reconsider the prospects of filing a defamation suit.
If the suit is filed in England, it is highly likely the libel plaintiff will be
victorious, but if the judgment cannot be enforced in the United States,
then the foreign judgment will effectively be rendered meaningless.
Without assets in the country from which the libel plaintiff can collect,
203
28 U.S.C. §§ 4101-05 (Congress’ findings state that “Some persons are
obstructing the free expression rights of United States authors and publishers, and in turn
chilling the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States interest of the citizenry
in receiving information on matters of importance, by seeking out foreign jurisdictions that
do not provide the full extent of free-speech protections.”) (emphasis added).
204
28 U.S.C. § 4104.
205
See discussion of differences between the United States and England’s libel
laws, supra Part I and II.
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206

the defamation suit is of little value. Furthermore, if the libel tourist
chooses to enforce the foreign judgment before the media defendant
seeks a declaratory judgment, and the libel tourist loses, he will be
207
subject to reasonable attorneys’ fees. Accordingly, the libel tourist has
much to lose with the enactment of the SPEECH Act, and it can
therefore be a very costly endeavor to protect one’s reputation.
On the other hand, for wealthy executives like Bin Mahfouz who
208
often bring these suits, seeking enforcement of the judgment is of no
great importance. Rather, these libel tourists initiate litigation to silence
American authors and journalists. The defamation suit acts as an
intimidation tool to threaten Americans from publishing writings on
209
subjects of international concern, specifically on matters of terrorism.
As a result, the SPEECH Act may provide little deterrent effect for
these particular libel tourists. However, as discussed above, by seeking
a declaratory judgment, the chilling effects are greatly diminished
because American authors and journalists will feel less threatened and
intimidated by foreign litigation and therefore continue to report on
matters of international concern.
B. Civil Procedure Perspective
The SPEECH Act grants a national service of process provision for
actions seeking declaratory relief in federal court. This provision will
make it easier to obtain personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant.
In other words, personal jurisdiction will be proper so long as the due
process minimum contacts requirement is satisfied or specific
210
jurisdiction is obtained. The nationwide service of process provision
will allow a court to sustain jurisdiction, provided that the foreign
defendant has some connection to the United States; the contacts do not
have to be found in a particular forum, but rather the United States as a

206

On the other hand, for example, Rachel Ehrenfeld cannot travel to the UK
without running the risk of being arrested to enforce Mahfouz’s judgment against her.
Hearing, supra note 1, at 14 (prepared statement of Rachel Ehrenfeld).
207
28 U.S.C. § 4105.
208
Bin Mahfouz posts on his website how often he brings defamation suits against
various American authors. See Bin Mahfouz Information, BIN MAHFOUZ,
http://www.binmahfouz.info/faqs_4.html.
209
Hearing, supra note 1, at 8 (prepared statement of the Honorable Peter King,
Representative in Congress from the State of New York).
210
See supra Part II B 1 (discussion of personal jurisdiction).
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211

whole. Courts have repeatedly held that when a federal statute
contains a national service of process provision the provision will
bestow personal jurisdiction in any federal district court on any
212
defendant with minimum contacts to the United States. This provision
ensures that a libel tourist, who may do occasional business throughout
the United States, but not enough to satisfy a minimum contacts test in a
particular jurisdiction, will still be amenable to suit in a federal court.
However, the SPEECH Act does not assure that personal
jurisdiction will be found in all cases. The constitutional requirements
must still be satisfied. If the foreign defendant has no contacts sufficient
to obtain jurisdiction, the U.S. court will have to dismiss the case for
lack of personal jurisdiction, and thus the declaratory judgment cause of
action will be of little assistance to the domestic plaintiff. Such an
outcome would be unfortunate, but it comports with due process.
New York’s Libel Terrorism Protection Act extended New York’s
long-arm statute to sustain personal jurisdiction over any person who
obtains a foreign defamation judgment against a resident of New York
or a person amenable to jurisdiction there, regardless of the foreign
213
defendant’s ties to the state. Although the law has not been
challenged, many critics argue that the jurisdictional provision violates
214
“long-standing principles of due process.” The Advisory Committee
on Civil Practice has questioned the constitutionality of the provision,
215
and predicted that it would face court challenges. So while the New
York law makes obtaining jurisdiction dramatically easier, it is most
likely unconstitutional. As a result, the SPEECH Act’s jurisdiction
provision is the greatest constitutional measure that can be taken, short
of an international solution.

211

28 U.S.C. § 4104(b).
See, e.g., Medical Mutual of Ohio v. DeSoto, 245 F.3d 561, 567 (6th Cir. 2001)
(holding that Congress has the power to confer nationwide personal jurisdiction); Mariash v.
Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138, 1142-43 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 allows for a national contacts test for personal jurisdiction).
213
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a) (CONSOL. 2012).
214
Staveley-O’Carroll, supra note 36, at 279.
215
Joel Stashenko, Civil Practice Committee Finds Fault with Libel Tourism Bill,
N.Y.L.J. March 4, 2008, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nylj/PubArticleNY.jsp?
id=1204544930713&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1.
212
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C. Comity and Reciprocity
While there are more direct ways to prevent a U.S. author or
publisher from defending a suit in a foreign court, for example, through
injunctive relief, this would cause great intrusion into the affairs of the
foreign tribunal. The SPEECH Act does not go this far. It does not
enjoin the foreign court proceedings, but does allow for lack of
jurisdiction as an additional ground for non-enforcement and a cause of
action for declaratory relief. In this way the SPEECH Act both respects
the sovereignty of other countries, while also protecting Americans’
216
First Amendment rights. The doctrine of comity allows a U.S. court to
enforce a foreign judgment, so long as it was rendered by a fair and
217
impartial process. Similarly, a U.S. court can refuse enforcement of a
foreign judgment if the laws of the foreign court do not comport with
the laws and Constitution of the United States on grounds of public
policy. These principles are not affected by the SPEECH Act. The law
does not automatically render a foreign defamation judgment
unenforceable. Rather, the party seeking enforcement, or the party
seeking declaratory relief, must prove that the foreign court’s
218
defamation law offends the principles of the First Amendment.
A declaration by a U.S. court that a foreign judgment is repugnant
to the First Amendment will give United States publishers a mechanism
and the comfort necessary to continue to publish their material,
regardless of a contrary verdict in England. For example, Bin Mahfouz
would not have been able to deter Rachel Ehrenfeld from publishing
similar allegations or material. Ehrenfeld does not have to wait for
Mahfouz to come to the United States to enforce his judgment against
her, but rather empowers Ehrenfeld to respond proactively.
D. Is the SPEECH Act Necessary?
The problems posed by libel tourism make clear that the Ehrenfeld
decision is not just an atypical case, and does not stand as an outlier.
Instead, libel tourism is a major threat to American authors and
publishers and to the First Amendment in general. As the many
illustrations and cases indicate, the readiness of British libel law judges
to generously extend the jurisdiction of their courts allows foreign
216
217
218

See supra note 200 (SPEECH Act’s definition of a United States person).
See supra Part IV (discussion of comity).
28 U.S.C. §§ 4101-05.
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claimants to bring suit even when the allegedly defamatory statement
219
has a tenuous connection to the United Kingdom. Although libel
tourism does threaten the First Amendment, the need for a federal
response is debatable. The tide seems to be turning in England, as recent
commentary suggests that England’s archaic libel jurisprudence may be
220
changing. In addition, other remedies for libel tourism exist. Such
remedies include a public policy argument and a proposed federal
statute that would create a uniform national rule for enforcement of
foreign country judgments not limited to the concern of libel tourism.
1. England’s Reaction to Libel Tourism
Even though libel tourism is a problem of international concern, it
could arguably be stated that with the existing law and various doctrines
already in place, the SPEECH Act is unnecessary legislation. To begin
with, there is reason to believe that England, the libel capital, is in the
process of amending their defamation laws.
An article from
Economist.com hinted that concerns are being expressed in Britain
221
regarding their defamation law. Denis MacShane, a senior Labour
MP, stated in a debate in the House of Commons, that libel tourism is
“an international scandal” and “a major assault on freedom of
222
information.” In addition, the article stated that a parliamentary
committee dealing with the media has “received a large number of
223
submissions from people worried about libel tourism.”
Furthermore, as discussed previously, British defamation case law
provides for exceptions to the traditional plaintiff-friendly standards. In
particular, in Jameel v. Wall Street Journal, the British court recognized
a defense to libel since the allegedly defamatory article dealt with a
224
matter of genuine public interest. In addition, the disputed statement
made a proper contribution to the whole force of the publication, the
publisher acted reasonably and fairly in obtaining the material, and the
219

See Hearing, supra note 1, at 153 (response to post-hearing questions from
Laura R. Handman, Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP) (citing recent examples of Britain’s
generous jurisdictional reach).
220
See infra Part VI D 1 (discussion of England’s reaction to libel tourism).
221
Are English Courts Stifling Free Speech Around the World?,
ECONOMIST.COM, Jan. 8, 2009, available at http://www.economist.com/node/12903058.
222
Id.
223
Id.
224
Jameel v. Wall St. Journal S.P.R.L. [2006] UKHL 44, [2007] 1 A.C. 359
(appeal taken from Eng.) (H.L.).
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225

disputed article was of important public interest. The defense in
Jameel is also known as the “responsible journalism” exception, which
allows a defendant to publish the disputed material if the statements are
researched and presented professionally and the subject matter is in the
226
public interest.
As a result, if Britain changes its defamation law, the SPEECH Act
will be deemed unnecessary for a majority of libel tourism suits.
However, English defamation law is deeply rooted, and thus highly
unlikely to reach the high level of protection one finds in the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution in the near future. On the
other hand, with the passage of the SPEECH Act, the British legislature
and courts may become more compelled to amend their defamation
laws in the direction of First Amendment protection of the press. In
other words, if American publishers and journalists choose not to
publish in England out of fear of a defamation suit, there will be more
227
incentive to amend British defamation law.
2. Redundancy
A related issue to the comity and reciprocity concerns is one of
redundancy. U.S. courts have already refused to enforce foreign
defamation judgments. As discussed previously, in Bachchan and
Telnikoff, the courts, on grounds of public policy, refused to enforce the
British libel judgments, concluding that the foreign judgments were
repugnant to the First Amendment. With these cases as precedent, other
U.S. courts may decide that they have the authority to refuse
enforcement, without the protection of the SPEECH Act.
In addition, there is a proposed federal statute creating a uniform
national rule for enforcement of foreign country judgments that has

225

Id.
Id.
227
See UNITED KINGDOM MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, DRAFT DEFAMATION BILL
CONSULTATION PAPER CP3/11 (March 2011), http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/
consultations/draft-defamation-bill-consultation.pdf, (proposing a new Defamation Bill that
will issue in the next few months that seeks to reduce the chilling effect on freedom of
expression that exists due to the present law); see generally What Does Lord Lester’s
Defamation Bill Propose?, GUARDIAN.CO.UK, May 27, 2010, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2010/may/27/lord-lester-defamation-bill-analysis; Criticized
Libel
Laws
to
Change,
PRESSTV,
Jan.
11,
2011
available
at
http://www.presstv.ir/detail/159744.html.
226
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228

been adopted by the American Law Institute (ALI). The recommended
legislation authorizes negotiation of agreements with foreign countries,
229
regarding reciprocal enforcement of each other’s judgments. The
legislation also offers incentives to foreign countries and their courts to
230
enforce the judgments from the United States.
On the other hand, the SPEECH Act provides a visible, targeted
response to the chilling effects of libel tourism. While U.S. courts have
refused enforcement of foreign defamation judgments, there is no
federal law mandating the recognition or refusal. The Uniform Foreign
Money Judgments Recognition Act has been adopted at the state level,
but not all states have adopted it, and those who have, have adopted
231
inconsistent versions. Therefore, one state may refuse enforcement as
repugnant to the public policy of the state; another state may recognize
the foreign judgment. In order for an American author or journalist to be
fully protected and certain that they will be protected by the laws of the
United States, the federal response was necessary. With the enactment
of the SPEECH Act, there is little doubt that all American authors and
publishers are bound by the principles set forth in the First Amendment.
CONCLUSION
The SPEECH Act provides a national response to the practice of
libel tourism. Although the Act will not deter all foreign defamation
litigation abroad, it is a step in the right direction. The gaps that are
found in the legislation are constitutionally inevitable. Short of an
international solution, the SPEECH Act reaches as far as
constitutionally permissible. In addition, the SPEECH Act reminds
United States citizens of America’s commitment that “debate on public
232
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.” The SPEECH
Act stands as a forceful barrier for those who wish to circumvent the
First Amendment and undo the free speech protections that hold an
acclaimed place in American society.

228
RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS 1-6, available at
http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?
fuseaction=publications.ppage&node_id=82
(Proposed
Federal Statute drafted by the American Law Institute).
229
Id.
230
Id.
231
See supra note 153.
232
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).

